This paper provides empirical evidence on the impact that private participation in infrastructure has had on key macroeconomic variables in a sample of 21 Latin American countries during the 1985-1998 period. Specifically, we look at the effects on GDP per capita, current public expenditures, public investment and private i nvestment, controlling for country effects and institutional factors. We also investigate the relevance of the specific contractual form of private participation contracts on these variables and show differentiated effects according to contract types. Our other main results suggest that: (i) private sector involvement in utilities and transport have some but not impressive positive effects on GDP per capita, (ii) there is some degree of crowding out of private investment resulting from greenfield projects in utilities and delayed crowding-in from concessions in transport; (iii) there is crowding-in of public investment by private participation in utilities while there is crowding out by increased private investment in transport; (iv) private participation in utilities decreases recurrent expenditures while in transport it results in an increase. The net effect on the public sector account is uncertain but this uncertainty is a major risk .The revelation of this risk may be the main contribution of this paper since it is inconsistent with the fiscal gains expected by many policymakers as they engage in infrastructure privatization programs.
Introduction
The relevance of the design of institutions for the effectiveness of policies is now well recognized by policymakers from all boards (see The World Bank, 2002 for a recent survey of the debate and of the evidence). This design becomes particularly important where reforms have significantly changes the types and roles of players. The restructuring of the infrastructure sector with a view to increase competition and private sector participation in Latin America over the last decade provides a clear example of such an institutional change. Since the late 1980s, many Latin American countries have indeed progressively opened their infrastructure sectors to private operators, seeking a remedy to structural deficits and hoping to foster investment and growth.
The literature on the impact of these reforms can be classified into three broad types. The first group focuses mostly on the macroeconomic effects of a macroeconomic view of the reforms -the "macro-macro" group -; the second, on the sector-specific effects of sector-specific reforms -the "micro-micro" group, and the third on the macroeconomic effects of sector specific reforms -the "micro-macro" group. The "macro-macro" category is by a wide margin the most populated. It has generally been supported by fairly detailed econometric analyses of the relatively good macroeconomic databases available (see McGillivray and Morrissey, 1999 , for a relatively recent survey). The "micro-micro" group has generated fewer analytically strong studies partially because detailed relevant data is not easy to obtain. Most of the published papers have focused on Argentina and Chile, where enough time has gone by to generate reasonable time series (for a recent overview, see Guasch, 2001) . A much more modest literature has focused the micro-macro group and looked at the macroeconomic effects of sector-specific reforms, even if these sectoral reforms have been key components of the overall macroeconomic restructuring agenda. Exceptions include the literature on the general equilibrium effects of reform or the literature on convergence (see De la Fuente, 2000, or Estache, Foster and Wodon, 2002) . This paper contributes to the "micro-macro" literature by offering a first empirical assessment of the macroeconomic effects of the increased private sector participation in the management and financing of the infrastructure sectors (PPI).
1 Its main purpose is to provide empirical evidence for Latin America of the effects on several key macroeconomic variables of the increased role of "privatization", defined as the decision to rely on the private sector to implement projects. 2 In this analysis, we also isolate some institutional factors and control by country effects, recognizing that each country in the region may face different sources of risks.
In view of these objectives, the paper suffers from at least two major drawbacks. First, the quality of the data available is a significantly restrictive factor and will force us to further limit the hope placed on being able to draw very strong policy conclusions. This drawback is however also a source of strength since it forces to highlight the main direction for additional work through the analysis. Second, it lacks an explicit theoretical model to justify the "micro-macro" effects of increased PPI. 3 However, our goal here is not to test any specific theory but rather to provide -if possible -statistically significant evidence on the sign and size of the effects of PPI on the most common macroeconomic indicators. We specify very general empirical relationships between each of our macroeconomic variables and different subsets of instruments that summarize when and how private participation was introduced in each country and under which institutional environment. Our results, therefore, do not look for causal liaisons; they represent correlations that may hint what the macroeconomic impact of "privatization" (if any) has been so far in Latin America.
In spite of these limitations, we manage to obtain useful results, relying on standard econometric technique. We, first, estimate pooled-data models ignoring country specific effects.
These models provide both initial values for the "micro-macro" effects and a benchmark for comparisons. However, if unobserved individual heterogeneity (i.e., country-specific effects) is relevant in our statistical relationships, its omission yields biased estimates. To overcome this problem, we also estimate panel data models that allow for an explicit testing of individual 1 Siniscalco et al. (2001) provide a recent similar study for OECD countries.
2 The recent literature on regulation theory explicitly acknowledges that the term "private participation" is much more general that "privatization". The former encompasses many different forms that include divestures, concessions, management contracts, leases, etc. (see Laffont and Tirole, 1998) . 3 The new growth theory literature is the most likely place to find such a model (see Aghion et al., 1999, for example) . On addition, political economy models may help explain under what circumstances privatization policies can be a success or a failure (see Alesina and Perotti, 1996) .
heterogeneity. 4 The differentiation between these two types of model specifications yields evidence on the effects of the "privatization" policies for the region as a whole as well as for average country specific effects.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodology followed to draw a minimum set of robust policy implications on the effects of PPI.
Section 3 describes the sample and defines the most relevant variables used. Section 4 summarizes the main results on the impact of private participation policies on each macroeconomic variable. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a quick summary of the main empirical implications.
Testing the macroeconomic effects of PPI
There is no simple way of anticipating the overall macroeconomic effects of a policy opening infrastructure to the private sector in a particular country because many tradeoffs are at stake. The best we can do with the kind of data available is to focus on "reduced" forms which net out more structural positive and negative effects of the reforms on the key macroeconomic variables because we do not have enough data to separate them. From the viewpoint of private investment, for instance, many privatization policies are usually expected to bring about positive results on the medium or long run if the overall efficiency of the economy is improved as a result of the policy changes. However, the long run payoffs may be preceded by short-run costs, if increased competition reduces margins and profits, hampering the investment capabilities of private investors. Since we can only look at the sectors at a very aggregate level and sector specific reforms are difficult to pick up, we can only see the accumulated effects of the policy changes year after year, as new investments results from all prior reforms and cannot be assigned to any specific policy change. This is why we focus on a very limited concern which has not been studied so far. We focus on identifying the sign of the effects that can be genuinely attributed to the net effects of private sector participation in infrastructure projects. The size of the effects is also computed but are for now less interesting since it probably represents a large number of effects with opposite signs.
4 See Chamberlain (1984) for a survey and examples on the use of macroeconomic panel data.
With these limitations in mind, the paper proposes a formal test of the consequences of infrastructure " privatization" as defined specifically later on four selected macroeconomic variables: total gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, private investment, public investment and current public expenditures. The first dependent variable is measured in levels. By focusing on per capita figures, we also get a chance at a modest look at the impact on poverty though income levels. The other four are calculated as a percentage of the GDP. Within infrastructure, we will additionally distinguish between utilities (electricity, gas, water and sanitation and telecommunications) and transportation (which include airports, ports, railways and roads) to test for possible differences. 5 Since the timing of the changes and the policy environment varies significantly across countries, we simultaneously control for a time trend and variables that represent the institutional framework. In addition, we specifically take into account and test the possible existence of (unobservable) country-effects.
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Formally, we handle the data in two separate ways. First, we use all available data, pooling together the whole information set into a single sample. In this pooled-data case, where each country and year is treated as separate observation (denoted by subscript i) and no individual heterogeneity is allowed, we specified and estimated the following linear relationship for each one of our five macroeconomic variables:
The term y i represents the dependent variable, α is the intercept, d' i is a vector of dummies that account for private participation and its starting year, and x' i is a vector of control variables that include a time trend and others that characterize the country's institutional framework; finally, ξ i is a normally distributed error term, uncorrelated with the regressors, and α, β, γ the (vectors of) parameters to estimate.
The variables included in x reflect the political and governance situation taking into account the degree of political stability of the country (approximated by the degree of internal conflict) and the strength of the governance structure of the country. According to the specification of x' i it is possible to derive a separate models from expression (2.1). In the first one (Model 1), the macroeconomic variables are explained by two dummy variables that reflect the existence or not of some form of privatization in utilities and in transport (they will be labeled DU, DT respectively). The second model (Model 2) tests, in addition, for the effect of investment associated with a specific form of private sector participation on each one of the macroeconomic variables. We will distinguish three types of "privatizations" associated with private investment:
divestures or sale of the assets (DIV), concessions (CONC) and greenfield projects (GP). Each of these variables is defined as the share of total investment from privatization associated with each contract type.
The expected sign on these explanatory variables varies with the macroeconomic variable explained. If we are to believe the predictions of the advocates of privatization, for GDP per capita and for domestic investment as percentage of GDP, we should expect a net positive effect of infrastructure privatization, since these are some of the core macroeconomic promises of privatization. For the share of public investment in GDP and for the share of current expenditures, the a priori expectation would be a negative sign since we expect infrastructure privatization to reduce the overall size of the public sector. In addition, we also expect stronger institutions to generate better macroeconomic performances. could be estimated again, using the same definitions of x provided above. The most significant difference between (2.2) and the pooled-data case is that a country-specific effect (labeled η j ) is explicitly accounted for, whereas the error term ξ jt is again normally distributed and uncorrelated with the regressors.
It is precisely the nonappearance of the country-specific term that may bias the estimates in the pooled-data case due to a standard "omitted-variable" problem (Amemiya, 1985) . Panel data models allow for a method to correct this problem, either using a "fixed-effects" or a "random-effects" approach. In the first case, the (unobserved) individual heterogeneity is represented as a parametric shift in expression (2.2). It is "as if" a new intercept, α j = α + η j , time-invariant and particular to each country, were defined and the estimation by ordinary least squares (OLS) would explicitly consider it. In the random effects case, the individual heterogeneity term is assumed to be part of the error term, u jt = η j + ξ jt . The model becomes heteroskedastic and must be estimated by Generalized Least Squares (GLS).
Unfortunately, both approaches do not always yield the same result, as observed by Hausman (1978) . However, if the effects of omitted variables can be appropriately summarized by a random variable and the (unobserved) individual effects may also represent the ignorance of the investigator, it does not seem unreasonable to treat in one case the source of ignorance as fixed (α j ) and in the other case as random (u jt ). It appears that one way to encompass the fixedeffects and the random-effects models is to assume from the outset that the effects are random and use GLS to estimate them. The immediate check, summarized in the so-called Hausman test, would be then to contrast whether the heteroskedasticity of the model allows a fixed-effect approach or not. 8 An Hausman test is used when there are two estimators of the parameter vector β (e.g. β GLS and β OLS ). Under the null hypothesis (H 0 ) individual effects are not correlated with the regressors, β GLS is consistent and efficient, but β OLS is inconsistent. Under the alternative H 1 , both estimators are consistent, but β GLS is inefficient. This allows a routinely performed comparison between fixed-effects and random-effects estimates.
A final important question regarding model specification is related to potential dynamic effects in our estimated relationships. In general, unless the economies behave in a hyper-rational way and manage to internalize instantaneous ly the effects of reform policies, the optimal lag for the dummies included in vector d should be different from zero. It is natural to expect that privatization may not bring its full (positive or negative) consequences immediately. Instead, based on a simple look at the facts in the region, a reasonable lag of one or two years should be considered. We investigate these dynamic effects by estimating, for each of our dependent variables, for each data case (pooled vs. panel), and for each of our models (Model 1 and 2) slightly different variations on (2.1) and (2.2) where the dummies have been lagged one and two periods. The results of all these estimations, reported in Section 4 below, allow us to analyze the macroeconomic effects of privatizations, by type of process, considering the existence of country-specific effects, and taking into account short rum versus medium-run impacts.
The variables, the data and their limitations
We have collected a sample that covers 21 Latin American countries, all from Mexico to Chile, excluding Caribbean states, Belize, Surinam and French Guyana. In principle, this geographical dispersion offers enough variety of infrastructure reform experiences and of income levels to yield useful policy conclusions. The time period covered stops in 1998, just before the effects of the Asian crisis started to have a major impact in the financing of Latin America's infrastructure.
The specific sample size for each macroeconomic variable considered in this study varies across the models estimated. This is driven by the fact that we could not obtain comparable data for all variables for all countries. The largest samples cover all of the 21 countries. The smallest focuses only on 16 countries. Since the overall sample tracks the changes in the role of the private sector in infrastructure for 14 years (from 1985 to 1998), the econometrics can make use of panel of data approaches as described above. Since there are several variables for which no information was available for some years, our panel is unbalanced.
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The macroeconomic dependent variables -GDP per capita, total public investment, total private investment, total gross domestic investment and current public expenditures, and public 9 However, this can easily be handled in the econometrics (Greene, 1995 The data quality issues already referred to start here. Indeed, there may be a measurement problem in the definition of several of these macroeconomic variables in relation to the concerns addressed here. According to the World Development Indicators database, public deficit, public expenditure and public investment all refer to the central government alone. However, much of the infrastructure-related activities are usually developed by public enterprises that may finance themselves outside the central government's budget. Even if most Latin American public enterprises get financed through government transfers and decline in infrastructures financial needs but be matched by a corresponding decline in the government budget, our data could produce some imprecise results. For example, they fail to capture much of the impact on deficits and public investment of utilities privatization if the current and/or capital expenditures on utilities prior to privatization used to be made by public firms rather than the government.
Furthermore, this effect may be different for different types of infrastructures (e.g., telecoms and power usually belonged to public enterprises, while roads and ports were typically under the central government). Fortunately, there is not a similar problem in the case of activities financed by regional government in Latin America. With the major exception of Brazil (in the case of roads, for example), the most relevant privatization transactions in the region always involved the central government.
The second matter of concern with the variables is the specific definition of "privatization". We rely on a set of "infrastructure privatization dummies" (d in the econometric model), constructed from The World Bank PPI database on private participation in infrastructure projects as follows:
• DU: takes a value of 1 starting on the first year there is a private utility project in a specific country (e.g. a private power generator or a private cellular operator).
• DT: takes a value of 1 starting on the first year there is a (significant) private operator of transport infrastructure in a specific country. Table 2 shows the first year in which each dummy takes the value of 1. The main problem with this variable is that it reflects the start of the reliance on some form of project finance scheme rather than a major effort to restructure the sector and to rely systematically on private finance and operation for most of the sector. The correlation between the variable constructed this way and a variable that would focus on major policy changes is strong but far from perfect. We decided to stick to this approach because project finance data is more closely related to actual investment levels expected to influence the levels of macroeconomic indicators, in particular for the public sector.
In addition, we also have tried to distinguish between contract types associated with each project. To do so, we constructed the following variables associated with the three types of infrastructure "privatization":
• DIV: is the number of divestitures or asset sales contracts in each year due to infrastructure privatizations for each of the two broad subsectors for each country.
• GP: is the number of greenfield projects contracts in each year due to infrastructure privatizations for each of the two broad subsectors for each country.
• CONC: is the number of concessions contracts in the database in each of the two subsectors.
Each contract type variable is multiplied by the relevant dummy to ensure that the contract type only kicks into the regression after the first privatization in utilities and transport has started. This is recognized by a DT and DU suffix attached below to each contract type in the tables summarizing the results. Notes: (1) Political stability is measured from 1 (low) to 12 (high). Corruption goes from 1 (bad) to 6 (clean).
Source: International Country Risk Guide. Table 3 shows the institutional explanatory variables used as r egressors in the model specifications (2.1) and (2.2) above are the following. Two institutional variables (labeled by x in the model) have been obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The index of political stability (D) is approximated by the inverse of the degree of violence and its impact on the ability of the government to govern. The countries are ranked on a scale of 1 to 12 with the lowest rating is allocated to the most unstable countries (e.g. countries during a civil war) and the highest rating does to the stable countries. The quality of the political system of the country (F) is also approximated by a ranking on a scale of 1 to 6. A ranking of 1 is allocated to the most corrupt countries. A value of 6 is allocated when a count ry is perceived to be corruption-free. 
The results
We relied on the LIMDEP v.7.0 econometric software to obtain OLS and GLS estimates of the linear specifications (2.1) and (2.2) described above. For each dependent variable (GDP per capita, GDI, public investment, public expenditure and public deficit) we first provide a 12 Goodness of fit measures in GLS models are usually controversial since R 2 measures losses effectiveness under heteroskedasticity. All the existing alternatives must be carefully interpreted, since they cannot be reliably used to compare models. Table 4 summarizes the estimates of Model 1 using GDP per capita as the dependent variable, both for the pooled data case and the panel data case. Since the comparison tests show that panel data estimates (using the fixed effects approach) are preferred to pooled data estimates, the results to consider are those in the final columns. Moreover, and even though the goodness of fit measures are to be taken cautiously in panel estimations, the values of the adjusted R 2 are relatively high. Overall, the preferred regression suggests that the trend matters strongly and that the institutional variables are highly significant with the expected sign, even when lagged dummies are considered into the regression. Note: Dependent variable is GDP per capita. t-ratios are calculated at 95% level of confidence.
Effects of private participation in infrastructure (PPI) on GDP per capita
As for the main focus of this paper, the coefficients on the PPI dummies, DU and DT, suggest that only PPI in transport infrastructure seems to have a positive (and significant) effect on GDP per capita, both when considered unlagged and when a lag of 1 or 2 periods is included.
These results are somewhat surprising, but imply that the effect of PPI on growth varies across infrastructure types in Latin America. The lagged dummies do not alter the signs or size of these effects very much, suggesting that the impact of PPI in transport may be distributed over time. Table 6 shows the results from Model 1 using private investment (as directly reported by the World Development Indicators database) as the dependent variable. We added an interest rate variable, LR (the lending rate listed in the IMF statistics) to ensure a better specification of the model. Both for the pooled data case and the panel data case.
Effects of infrastructure PPIs on private investment
As in Table 4 above, country-specific effects are very relevant, according to Breusch and Pagan's LR test, but now the Hausman tests suggests that random effects, instead of fixed ones are the preferable way to specify η j . In general, it seems that this is not as good a model to explain what happens to private investment. The trend continues to be a significant factor as is the degree of political stability. The measure of corruption used does not perform well as it does not appear to have a statically significant effect. Most interesting from our viewpoint is the fact that the PPI dummies (except for DT when lagged two periods) are never significant. Table 7 tells us a very similar story. Again, panel data (with random effects) are preferable to pooled data, but the overall significance of the model is lower than for GDP per capita. As for our variable of concern, the emerging story is interesting. It suggests that greenfield projects can make a difference but do so with a negative sign, implying some crowding out of other private investment projects. The results also shows, somewhat expectedly, that concession contracts in transport have a positive lagged effect on private investment. As well known by the specialists of investment promotion programs, good transport services are crucial to attract investment. These results confirm their experience. Note: Dependent variable is private investment. t-ratios are calculated at 95% level of confidence.
Since we had some concern on the quality of the dependent variable used, we also ran the models by redefining private investment as the difference between total investment and public investment. This analysis is carried out in Table 8 , where Model 1 (and Model 2 but not reported here) has been re-estimated using this new definition of the dependent variable. The estimatesonce more, panel data ones -score slightly better, particularly the institutional variables (same signs that in Tables 4 and 5 ) and the utilities PPI dummy, but again the overall significance of the model is not as good as we had hoped. They do suggest however that there is a lagged crowding out taking place during the 1980-1990s as a result of the increased presence of private sector participation in utilities. Note: Dependent variable is private investment defined as GDI -Public Investment.
Effects of infrastructure PPIs on public investment
The estimates in Table 9 summarize the effects of PPI policies on public investment. The overall statistical results are similar to those of previous tables (particularly, again panel data is preferred and political stability is the strongest institutional explanatory variable). The coefficients of the policy variables reveal several notable differences. First, the unlagged PPI dummies are significant and have the strongest statistical significance but the impact of PPI is still strong with a one year lag as well. Second, and much more interestingly, the PPI in utilities and transport infrastructures has a different sign (positive and negative, respectively). PPI in utilities complement or crowd-in public investments, while PPI in transport substitutes for or crowds -out public investment. What this may reflect is the fact that reforms in the utilities sector are used by governments to raise matching resources from private operators for the sector where as for transports, private investments allow governments to reduce its commitments to the sector in terms of expansion at least. These results hold however at the very aggregate level because we are not able to draw similar, albeit more subtle, conclusions from a dis-aggregation of contract types. Note : Dependent variable is public investment. t-ratios are calculated at 95% level of confidence.
Effects of infrastructure PPIs on recurrent public expenditures
The effects of PPI on recurrent public expenditures summarized in Tables 11 and 12 The coefficients of the policy variables reveal several new elements. First, the PPI dummies for utilities has a declining impact over time (as seen in the declining t ratios for the lagged variables) while it is increasing for the transport dummies. are significant and have the strongest statistical significance but the impact of PPI is still strong with a one year lag as well.
Second, the PPI in utilities and transport infrastructures has a different sign (negative and positive, respectively). PPI in utilities reduces recurrent public expenditures while PPI in transport seem to increase these recurrent expenditures. For transport, this reflects the common wisdom among practitioners that investments in the sector are only viable when the operation of the services allowed by the investment are subsidized. For utilities, it may reflect the fact that PPI often lead to significant cost reductions and that subsidy levels tend to decline once private operators take over operations. 
Conclusions
This paper provides empirical evidence on the impact that private participation in infrastructure has had on key macroeconomic variables in a sample of 21 Latin American countries during the 1985-1998 period. Specifically, we look at the effects on GDP per capita, current public expenditures, public investment and private investment, controlling for country effects and institutional factors. The most interesting initial conclusions focus on the sign of these effects of the average macro effects of these micro reforms as estimated from model 1. Table 13 summarizes the main results with respect to the statistically significant signs we have been able to identify. The first obvious fact to emerge from Table 13 is that transport and utilities "privatization" should not be expected to have the same macroeconomic effects. Transport has a significant positive effect on per capita income, utilities has none observable. Second., PPI, at best, leaves private investment constant but in the case of utilities tends to crowd it out, which is the opposite of the effect it has on public investment. Indeed, the third result to emerge is from a public sector perspective. Utilities lead to increases in public investments but reduce recurrent expenditures. The opposite holds for transport. In other words, there is crowding-in of public investment for PPI in utilities and crowding-out for transport. Also, while private transport investments require a matching commitment to operational subsidies, the arrival of private utilities operators reduces the burden of these operational subsidies.
The results generated by model 2 are in general less interesting. Indeed, the disaggregation of PPI per contract type yielded few statistically significant results. The most interesting ones are that Divestitures, the strongest form of commitment to private sector has clear positive effects on GDP per capita. The second interesting result is that concession contracts and Greenfield projects in transport have significant payoffs in terms of future investments.
Fina lly, divestitures in utilities and transport concessions tend to increase recurrent expenditures.
These results, however limited, provide a first set of econometric evidence on the macro effects of micro reforms for the region in which PPI policies have been the most active. Much better data is needed to draw more specific and more robust policy conclusions. Much more ambitious econometric analysis is also needed. In particular, causality has not been tested and an optimal lag structure has not been identified because of data limitations. As the PPI experience progresses and more and better data becomes available, we should be able to refine these results.
But for now, these results provide already enough reasons to be concerned about a good assessment of t he macro and in particular the fiscal effects of private participation in infrastructure. The fact that the effects on GDP/capita at neutral at worse and most probably positive is good news but it comes at a risk with respect to its effects on the public sector accounts. The revelation of this risk may be the main contribution of this paper since it is inconsistent with the fiscal gains expected by many policymakers as they engage in infrastructure privatization programs.
